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Advanced Search Abstract Legal philosophers have long debated the question, what is law? But few in social science have attempted to explain the phenomenon of legal order. In this article, we build a rational choice model of legal order in an environment that relies exclusively on decentralized enforcement, such as we find in Characteristics of law societies prior to the emergence of the nation state and in many modern settings.
We demonstrate that we can support an equilibrium in which wrongful behavior is effectively deterred by exclusively decentralized enforcement, specifically collective punishment. Equilibrium is achieved by an institution that supplies a common logic for classifying behavior as wrongful or not.
We argue that several features ordinarily associated with legal order—such as generality, impersonality, open process, and stability—can be explained by the incentive and coordination problems facing collective punishment.
What distinguishes legal order from spontaneous social order? How can we identify when a community is governed by the rule of law? What institutions support the effort to pattern behavior on the basis of deliberately chosen legal rules?
These questions lie at the heart of numerous projects in economics and politics—explaining the evolution of social order in human communities, building markets to support economic growth in poor and developing countries, establishing the necessary architecture for stable Characteristics of law governance, managing the increasingly integrated transactions of a globalized web-based economy.
Nonetheless, economists and positive political theorists to date have had almost nothing to say about these questions.
The vast majority of economic and Characteristics of law political theory focuses on the substance of legal rules but not the characteristics of distinctively legal order per se. In this article, we initiate the project of filling the gap in law and economics and PPT by developing a rational choice model of legal order.
The principal goal of our work is to develop an account of legal order that does not presume that legal order is characterized, necessarily, by the types of institutions we see today in modern developed nation states: Legal order arises in so many different environments, ranging from early human societies prior to the development of the nation state to a globalized interdependent civil society that in many ways transcends the nation state.
Developing a systematic social scientific account of law that identifies the conditions under which legal order emerges and is stabilized requires that we abstract from the particular institutions embodying law in modern nation states.
In particular, we claim that it is critical that a social scientific account of law does not presume that law is necessarily characterized by centralized punishment—delivered by a formal institution with coercive power, such as a government.
Our framework thus allows for the possibility that law is enforced by decentralized mechanisms and the model we present in this article demonstrates that we can achieve legal order exclusively on the basis of decentralized enforcement, without any centralized coercive authority.
This possibility marks a major departure from the implicit definition of law employed in most economic and positive political theory. Ellicksondefines law as rules that are enforced by governments rather than social forces.
By decentralized enforcement, we mean that the imposition of penalties results from individual decisionmaking among ordinary agents acting independently, not the decisionmaking of official legal actors such as police or judges nor the result of express pacts for collective action.
Our reason for excluding the existence of a centralized enforcement body from our model is to develop a framework capable of analyzing a range of questions concerning if and when centralized enforcement of law is necessary or sufficient to secure legal order.
These are critical questions if we seek to explain the emergence of legal order prior to the organization of states with a monopoly over legitimate force, the potential for establishing the rule of law in environments with weak or corrupt governments, or the feasibility of establishing legal order in exclusive reliance on centralized coercive force i.
Analysis of these questions is not possible if we follow the dominant assumption in economics and political science that law is, by definition, a set of rules enforced by government. We therefore propose a different definition of legal order to guide the development of a positive framework for analyzing the emergence and characteristics of law.
We propose these criteria as indicia of legal order for the purposes of positive analysis because they capture the fundamental policy role of law that makes the study of law of interest to economists and political theorists: Many mechanisms and institutions shape behavior, of course: What makes law of interest to economists and positive political theorists, however, is the capacity for deliberately changing behavior patterns in order to achieve normative goals such as economic growth, the security of individual freedoms, or the redistribution of wealth.
Our proposed criteria for identifying legal order aim to distinguish a system in which norms are emergent, arising as a matter of practice from repeated interactions, and one in which norms are deliberately articulated and systematically implemented. Our approach thus tracks a basic distinction drawn by H.
As Hart recognized, a system without secondary rules is dependent on slow adaptation to respond to changes in the environment or desired outcomes; a system with secondary rules is capable of deliberate effort to change behavior.
As with Hart's definition, our definition has to be understood as minimal: We leave open, then, the challenging task of fully distinguishing legal order from other forms of deliberate social order. For further discussion of this point, see Section 3, below. In this paper, we take up instead the more focused task of showing that an equilibrium that meets our minimal criteria for a legal order can be secured in a setting in which penalties for wrongful behavior are delivered exclusively by decentralized collective punishment.
That is, we demonstrate the possibility of legal order without a third-party centralized enforcement mechanism, such as the state or some other powerful actor with an effective monopoly of force.
Moreover, we demonstrate that the equilibrium displays several attributes that are often associated with our intuitions about the nature of law or the rule of law.
The legal order in our model is characterized, for example, by the existence of general rules and impersonal abstract reasoning implemented by open, public, and neutral procedures. These are attributes that many legal philosophers e. We discuss this literature in more depth in Sections 3 and 4.
In our model, these attributes are directly attributable to sustaining the efficacy of decentralized collective punishment. This is in contrast to the conventional focus in legal theory on the relationship between the attributes of law and the capacity of an individual to be guided by rules or the normative limits on the exercise of force by a coercive power such as a government.Undoubtedly, law does involve in many cases the imposition of centralized coercive force and in order for the exercise of such force to constitute governance by law and not arbitrary power, law must have certain characteristics.
Transcript of 5 Characteristics of a Good Law. 5 Characteristics of a Good Law Characteristic 1 Fair Characteristic 2 Understandable Characteristic 3 Reasonable Characteristic 4 Enforcement Characteristic 5 Equality.
Full transcript. More presentations by vanessa marin Family. . Characteristics of a good law. What are the characteristics of a good law? In order for a law to qualify as a good law, it must have the following characteristics: The law must be in the interest of the people: All good laws must be in the interest of the people whose lives and behavior they seek to control and regulate.
Here, the law must be. The main characteristic of the law is that it does not necessarily serve justice; it is enacted to bring an order to the society and prevent chaos so that the system continues to exist.
Views. Ali Yousaf, Bachelor of Laws from University of London () Answered Mar 28, Characteristics of Common Law pfmlures.com of LawThe rule of law, upheld by an independent judiciary, is one of Hong Kongs greatest strengths.
This refers to some of the fundamental principles of law that govern the way in which power is exercised in Hong Kong. Law is a system of rules that are created and enforced through social or governmental institutions to regulate behavior.
Formal legal rationality was his term for the key characteristic of the kind of coherent and calculable law that was a precondition for modern political developments and the modern bureaucratic state.